To overcome deficits of the Lindahl solution concept when the economy does not exhibit constant returns to scale, Kaneko (1977a) introduced the concept of a ratio equilibrium. The ratio correspondence selects for each economy its set of ratio equilibrium allocations. In this paper we provide a simple market game that double implements the ratio correspondence in Nash and strong equilibria.
Introduction
Given some domain of economies, a choice correspondence selects for each economy a set of feasible allocations. The choice correspondence may be thought of as an abstract representation of either the ideals of the society, or the preferences of a planner. The problem of manipulation arises when agents in a society have information about the true nature of the economy that is not known to the planner. If we were to ask the agents directly "what do you know" and then apply the given correspondence, some agent may strategically use this information to manipulate the allocation recommended by the correspondence.
Given the possibility of manipulation, the (Nash) implementation problem is to design a game such that when we allow for strategic play, the allocations that result from (Nash) equilibria of the game, are exactly the allocations that the given correspondence selects. If such a game can be found we say that the game implements the choice correspondence on the domain.
In this paper we consider economies with public goods, and we are interested in choice correspondences that select efficient and individually rational allocations. This literature has a long history in economics. Samuelson (1954) conjectured that any decentralized ('spontaneous') mechanism for allocating public goods efficiently would be doomed to fail, as "... it is in the selfish interest of each person to give false signals" (Samuelson, 1954, pp. 388 ). Samuelson's intuition can be stated formally as a theorem, proved by Hurwicz (1972) , showing that there does not exist a choice correspondence which, when we ask players to directly reveal their preferences, yields Pareto-optimal and individually rational outcomes. However, subsequently, by using abstract strategy spaces, Hurwicz (1979a ,b), Walker (1981 , McKelvey (1989), and Tian (1989) , developed games that, for constant returns to scale economies, implemented the Lindahl correspondence. Thus the Nash equilibrium outcomes of their games are both Pareto-optimal and individually rational.
In this paper we depart from the previous work in three respects: (i) we allow for more general technology than constant returns to scale (CRS); (ii) we do not exclude the possibility that some subset of the agents may communicate and conspire to manipulate the outcome, and (iii) we want the game form to resemble the operation of a 'market'. We address each of these points in turn.
Most of the public goods implementation literature has focused on the Lindahl correspondence. The Lindahl correspondence is often viewed as the public goods equivalent of the Walrasian correspondence for private goods economies. However, in the absence of CRS, Lindahl pricing generates a surplus (or deficit) that must be shared among agents to obtain an efficient outcome. The question then arises; as public goods are typically publicly provided, if the technology is jointly owned by the society, how is the share rule determined? In general the answer is not transparent. However, even if we can justify a particular share rule, the Lindahl allocations may fail to be in the core as defined by Foley (1970) . Indeed the Lindahl allocations may fail to be individually rational, Kaneko (1977a) , Moulin (1989) . Thus if we are interested in correspondences that select efficient and individually rational outcomes, the Lindahl correspondence loses its appeal. Similarly the balanced linear cost share equilibria recently introduced by MasColell and Silvestre (1989) also falls to always select individually rational allocations, Wilkie (1989) . However, the ratio correspondence, introduced in Kaneko (1977a,b) , meets our requirements and so we focus on implementing it.
Our second point concerns the possibility of coalition formation. Most of the
